

Personality and the Planning Process

**A Monograph
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14. ABSTRACT

Military planning is a logical, systematic process for conducting problem solving and decision making. The planning process exists to support the commander in making decisions. As a part of the operations process (planning, preparation, execution and assessment driven by battle command) military planning uses standard procedures (doctrine) to provide courses of action as solutions and to recommend decisions. Planning is continuous whether it is branch or sequel planning, refinement of an existing plan, or planning for the next operation. The Army process is the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP), which is conducted by people with individual personalities. Personality affects how people think and behave. Individual personality type impels behavior (public and private), drives attitude, and compels cognitive functions. Leadership is a function of command and control and battle command drives the operations process. The extent to which leaders master the domains of the Army leadership framework accounts for some of the consistency among professionals. Fundamental personality types account for some of the differences. These differences affect friendly forces and enemy forces alike. Understanding differences as a function of personality type can facilitate increased competence for commanders and individual staff officers. This paper is based on theories of personality type (C.G. Jung's psychological types, Katherine Briggs and Isabel Briggs Myers work on the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), and David Keirsey's Four Temperaments) which propose explanations of the phenomena that make up individual personalities. Analysis of historical vignettes (Korea, 1951 and Operation Market-Garden, 1944) illustrates differences in perception and judging functions which effect individual cognition and behavior. The analysis is from the perspective of four hypothetical planners representing the Keirsey temperaments of personality using the MDMP applied to the historical problems in the vignettes. The potential differences can be profound as the 'NT' conceptualizes the vision and systems to learn what might happen, the 'SP' generates alternatives yet prefers to take life as it comes, the 'SJ' trusts concrete procedures and keeps all things scheduled and in their place, and the 'NF' demonstrates empathy for those conducting the process and those affected by it. Leaders, and particularly commanders and chiefs of staff, should incorporate their understanding of individual personality type into the entire operations process--particularly planning. They can capitalize on individual strengths, develop weaknesses, and mitigate misunderstanding among the unaware.

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Abstract

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Military planning is a logical, systematic process for conducting problem solving and decision making. The planning process exists to support the commander in making decisions. As a part of the operations process (planning, preparation, execution and assessment driven by battle command) military planning uses standard procedures (doctrine) to provide courses of action as solutions and to recommend decisions. Planning is continuous whether it is branch or sequel planning, refinement of an existing plan, or planning for the next operation. The Army process is the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP), which is conducted by people with individual personalities.

Personality affects how people think and behave. Individual personality type impels behavior (public and private), drives attitude, and compels cognitive functions. Leadership is a function of command and control and battle command drives the operations process. The extent to which leaders master the domains of the Army leadership framework accounts for some of the consistency among professionals. Fundamental personality types account for some of the differences. These differences affect friendly forces and enemy forces alike. Understanding differences as a function of personality type can facilitate increased competence for commanders and individual staff officers.

This paper is based on theories of personality type (C.G. Jung's psychological types, Katherine Briggs and Isabel Briggs Myers work on the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), and David Keirsey's Four Temperaments) which propose explanations of the phenomena that make up individual personalities. Analysis of historical vignettes (Korea, 1951 and Operation Market-Garden, 1944) illustrates differences in perception and judging functions which effect individual cognition and behavior. The analysis is from the perspective of four hypothetical planners representing the Keirsey temperaments of personality using the MDMP applied to the historical problems in the vignettes.

The potential differences can be profound as the "NT" conceptualizes the vision and systems to learn what might happen, the "SP" generates alternatives yet prefers to take life as it comes, the "SJ" trusts concrete procedures and keeps all things scheduled and in their place, and the "NF" demonstrates empathy for those conducting the process and those affected by it. Leaders, and particularly commanders and chiefs of staff, should incorporate their understanding of individual personality type into the entire operations process--particularly planning. They can capitalize on individual strengths, develop weaknesses, and mitigate misunderstanding among the unaware.

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INTRODUCTION

The army is a complex organization consisting of various systems and resources. Since people are the most important resource and since all combat involves soldiers, no amount of technology can reduce the importance of the human dimension. With a common goal of mission accomplishment, commanders and staffs initiate and integrate all military functions and operations. Military operations have both a functional component and a personal component. Operational art is “the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals through the design, organization, integration, and execution of battles and engagements into campaigns and major operations.”¹ The functional component of operations is represented by the linkage of tactics to strategy (means to ends) through a series of tactical events. The personal component of operations is revealed in the mind and personality of the force commander, as well as his senior staff officers and subordinate commanders.²

Commanders and their staffs, organized to undertake and complete military activities, must exercise command and control based on human characteristics as well as on equipment and procedures. The application of operational art determines when, where, and for what purpose major forces will be employed to influence the enemy disposition before combat.³ The heart of operational art is the commander and the battle staff. The knowledge, experience, and personality of commanders define how they interact with their units. In the words of Field Marshal William Slim, “Command is an extension of personality.”⁴

¹ Department of the Army Headquarters, *Field Manual (FM) 100-5. Operations* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993). Glossary-6.

² Department of the Army Headquarters, *Field Manual (FM) 3-0. Operations (DRAG Edition)* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2000). 2-3.

³ Ibid. 2-3.

⁴ William Slim, *Higher Command in War* (Quantico, Virginia: US Marine Corps Command and Staff College), Lecture.

One's personality is "the totality of qualities and traits, as of character or behavior, that are peculiar to an individual person."⁵ This definition serves only to reinforce that people (commanders and individual staff members) are unique. What is critical for this research is not only *that* people are singular entities but *how* they are so. There is an oversimplified tendency to attribute some behavior to a nebulous, ill-defined category of personality. One's personality plays a part in shaping behavior and cognition and it affects the systems, resources, and processes that require human interaction. In order to demonstrate the part that personality plays, it is necessary to illuminate the role of personality in organizations.

Investment in people (human capital) is the key to organizational success. The six Army imperatives: Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, Organization, Materiel, and Soldier Systems (DTLOMS) impact the concepts for force design. The army as an organization is subject to the influences of doctrine (and dogma), the effectiveness of training and leadership (and leader development), the structure of a hierarchical organization, and the integration of technology. However, the dynamics of group behavior and personality can have profound (though perhaps subtle) impact on the commander, the staff, and the organization. The impact of human interaction can be realized by analyzing the attributes, skills, and actions of people in organizations. Organizational processes consist of the connections between and among people, systems, and procedures. Communication is the key to establishing and clarifying these connections. The goal of this research is to increase communication and understanding among the battle staff and commander.

The perennial argument of whether leaders are born or made has not been put to rest. In the introduction to *The Challenge of Military Leadership*, Lieutenant General (retired) Walter F. Ulmer Jr. states, "Our assumption is that behaviors *can* be taught and nourished. Whether those

⁵ *The American Heritage Dictionary*, Second ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1982). 926.

basic attitudes underlying leaders' behavior can be greatly modified remains of major import to our leader identification and selection systems."⁶ The characteristics of leadership can be taught over time, and the best teacher is experience. However, those basic attitudes underlying leader's behavior are a function of personality.

Both friendly and enemy forces seek to maintain the cohesion of their force in the physical domain, maintain the organization of their force in the cybernetic domain, and preserve the integration of their force in the moral domain.⁷ These multiple domains illustrate that military operations cannot satisfactorily be reduced to Lanchesterian equations or numerical correlation of forces.⁸ These same domains complicate the design of simulations and wargames. Scientific experimentation ideally isolates a single independent variable and generates consistent results from identical procedures. But isolating any variable in the complexity of warfare is precarious and generating consistent results (even from identical procedures) is improbable.

"The art of war deals with living and with moral forces."⁹ Here, Clausewitz wrote about rudimentary psychology before it was a mature field. A most important aspect inferred from his writing is that there exists a personality component on both sides of a conflict because "war is not the action of a living force upon a lifeless mass . . . but always the collision of two living forces."¹⁰ Commanders use moral forces (in combination with physical and cybernetic forces) to impose their will upon the enemy. "Consult the tactical series of field manual at any level. There you will find commanders described as planners, synchronizers, tacticians, and data processors--

⁶ Lloyd J. Matthews and Dale E. Brown, eds. *The Challenge of Military Leadership* (McClean, Virginia: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1989). ix.

⁷ James J. Schneider, "Theoretical Paper No. 3: The Theory of Operational Art," (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1988). 5.

⁸ For further explanation of Lanchester's equation see James J. Schneider, "Theoretical Paper No. 4: Vulcan's Anvil: The American Civil War and the Emergence of Operational Art," (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: School of Advanced Military Studies, 1991). 2-4.

⁹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976). 86.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* 77.

anything, in fact, but leaders who depend on flesh-and-blood soldiers to win their battles.”¹¹ It is the origin of differences in living forces--leaders--that lies at the heart of this paper.

Planning

Full spectrum operations follow a process of planning, preparing, and executing while continually assessing outputs and the need for input.¹² This paper focuses on planning, with the understanding that planning is part of the operations process, which is cyclical and overlapping. Planning is continuous whether it is branch or sequel planning, refinement of an existing plan, or planning for the next operation. The word planning comes from the Latin *planum*, meaning flat surface. The word “entered the English language in the Seventeenth Century, referring principally to forms, such as maps or blueprints, that were drawn on flat surfaces. Thus the word has long been associated with formalized documents.”¹³ The plan becomes a common point of reference for operations. The staff assists the commander with the detailed analysis and coordination necessary to convert planning guidance and the commander’s intent into the formalized document--the plan.¹⁴

An operational definition of planning must include some observable phenomena in organizations. Planning consists in formalized procedures specifically regarding an integrated system of decisions through decomposition, articulation, and rationalization.¹⁵ Military planning is a formal, systematic process of dissecting a problem into its component parts and constructing courses of action as solutions in order to frame decisions and execute a strategy. The process

¹¹ Steven J. Eden, "Leadership on Future Fields: Remembering the Human Factors in War," *Military Review* 79, no. 3 (1999). 38.

¹² Headquarters, *FM 3-0*. 6-1.

¹³ Henry Mintzberg, *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994). 14.

¹⁴ Headquarters, *FM 3-0*. 6-1.

¹⁵ Mintzberg, *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning*. 14-15.

ideally requires generating varied options, conducting detailed analysis, and making specific, rational recommendations to the commander on how to proceed. “Plans specify what commanders will decide personally.”¹⁶

The Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) was formalized with the publishing of FM 101-5, *Staff Organization and Operations*, which established a logical, systematic, step-by-step process for conducting planning and recommending decisions. “The MDMP is an adaptation of the Army’s analytical approach to problem solving.”¹⁷ In the joint arena, planning is codified in Joint Publication 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*, which likewise delineates planning into a logical construct. The MDMP and joint planning processes have proven valuable and they are familiar to all military leaders.

“The MDMP is a single, established, and proven analytical process.”¹⁸ The commander and the staff develop estimates and a plan through the MDMP. The estimates and the plan are situational. The estimates of the situation and the orders resulting from the planning process conform to the contemporary situation and seek to influence that situation. The context of each situation is dynamic and complex; therefore, the planning process is subject to the dichotomy of effectiveness versus efficiency. This separation is one that can be explained by an investigation of individual personality type.

Personality Type

Individual personality type impels behavior (public and private), drives attitude, and compels cognitive functions.¹⁹ Many have recognized that there are those individuals who excel

¹⁶ Headquarters, *FM 3-0*. 6-1.

¹⁷ Department of the Army Headquarters, *Field Manual (FM) 101-5. Staff Organization and Operations* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997). 5-1.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* 5-1.

¹⁹ C.G. Jung, “Psychological Types,” in *The Basic Writings of C.G. Jung*, ed. Violet de Laszlo (New York: Random House, 1923). 185-189.

at generating ideas and inspiring the big picture but have an aversion for details. Other individuals excel at in-depth analysis but have a hostility for pie-in-the-sky ideas which are not apparently based on the details at hand. The differences in these simplistic examples demonstrate differences in individual cognitive functions, but the value of this research is not in the mere recognition of differences. The appreciation of differences is only the beginning.

As this research demonstrates the predictability of classifiable human behavior, it facilitates an appreciation that human behavior is not random. Appreciation leads to knowledge and applied knowledge becomes understanding.²⁰ Understanding differences as a function of personality type can facilitate increased competence for commanders and individual staff officers. Mission accomplishment is all important, but considering the domains of military operations (physical, cybernetic, and moral) understanding personality type can increase effectiveness and efficiency.

Commanders and staff planners on battle staffs each have individual personalities, which equip them with distinctive and sharply contrasting ways of perceiving the world around them and judging the information they perceive. These cognitive functions (perceiving and judging) are the first evidence of the influence of personality type. Personality type also influences the energy sources that drive planners, as well as the cognitive functions in which they operate routinely. Planners conduct the planning process to serve their commanders, and the differences in individual personalities must effect the manner in which commanders and staffs operate within the organization.

Development of compensating behaviors and assignment of tasks based on personality type could change the way that military planners execute planning. The planning process is unlikely to change radically, and individual personality types do not change. There are planning

²⁰ Schneider, "Theoretical Paper No. 3: The Theory of Operational Art,". 2.

functions which are best suited for particular personality types and leaders can take advantage of this fact. Individuals can also recognize that their mental processes are unevenly developed (not a function of intelligence, but merely personality type) and can consciously work to develop compensating behaviors in tasks requiring the use of their neglected, less-developed processes.

The army organization consists of people, and personality affects how people think and behave. The operations process includes planning which is conducted by people with individual personalities. These differences affect friendly forces and enemy forces alike. This introductory material leads to the primary research question. Do planners with differing personality types--different ways of perceiving (sensing and intuition) and judging (thinking and feeling)--conduct the planning process differently?

THEORETICAL FOUNDATION

To provide a framework for discussion of the phenomena of personality and planning, it is necessary to establish and validate accepted theories. Theory is “the body of systematically organized knowledge devised to analyze, predict, or otherwise explain the nature or behavior of specific phenomena.”²¹ True theory should stand the test of time while doctrine is commonly established by precedent, within a particular paradigm or construct, which accommodates the environment in which one operates. Theory and doctrine have common goals: (1) utilitarian--to improve performance or operations, (2) pedagogic--to instruct, and (3) cognitive--to facilitate and frame thought.²² The relevant theories of personality and planning will be addressed in kind.

²¹ *The American Heritage Dictionary*, Second ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1982). 1260.

²² Clausewitz, *On War*. 14.

Theory of Personality Type

Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961) dedicated more than sixty years of his life to psychiatric experimental research and clinical investigations in his native Zurich, Switzerland to lay the groundwork for a psychology of the *spirit*.²³ He investigated the spontaneous activities that originate in regions of the psyche known as the *unconscious*. Before establishing Jung's theory of personality types, it is fair to note that in 1912 Sigmund Freud (a colleague of Jung's) found unacceptable Jung's differing concept of the libido and the concept of an independent *collective unconscious* (far beyond the *personal unconscious* of Freudian dreams and instinctual lust).²⁴

In order to understand the body and intent of Jung's work, a brief description of some of his writing is in order. Jung declared that there are two kinds of *thinking*: (1) the directed thinking in logical sequences (which is commonly understood thinking) and (2) the "spontaneous, imaginative, largely non-verbal and non-logical processes which are the raw material of all creative activity."²⁵ Jung also spoke of typical distinctions of attitude, which are marked by the direction of individual interest (or libido movement). The interest of the *extraverted* (expressive) person flows outward towards surrounding objects, people, and abstractions. The outside world engages and holds his interest. The *introverted* (reserved) person directs his interest towards his inner life and internal reactions (responses to stimuli in the environment or spontaneously arising thoughts, images, and feelings from the unconscious).²⁶ Finally, Jung designated four basic psychological *functions*. The rational functions are *thinking* (tough-minded) and *feeling* (friendly) and they are the directed functions which make decisions or judge raw information.

²³ Spirit: "The animating or vital principle in man, the immaterial intelligent or sentient part of a person." (Definition from the *Oxford English Dictionary*)

²⁴ Violet de Laszlo, ed. *The Collected Works of C.G. Jung* (New York: Random House, 1959). viii-xi.

²⁵ C.G. Jung, "Symbols of Transformation," in *The Basic Writings of C.G. Jung*, ed. Violet de Laszlo (New York: Random House, 1956). 16-18.

²⁶ Jung, "Psychological Types," 184-187.

The irrational functions (irrational does not denote something outside of the province of reason but that which is not established by reason)²⁷ are *sensation* (observant) and *intuition* (introspective) which are concerned with the incidental perceptions of occurrences and information.²⁸

These attitudes and functions spring from the inborn collective unconscious. Jung called these inner disposition or propensities *archetypes*, which comes from the Greek meaning the “prime imprinter”--for example in manuscripts, it denotes the original, the basic form for later copies.²⁹ The archetypes function whenever there are no conscious ideas present, or when those that are present are impossible. Typical patterns (of behavior and cognition) are accessible to consciousness, but the archetypes function as unconscious propensities that “select” contents of extraneous origin, assimilate, and integrate them. The selected contents are presumed by the individual to be determined by the object when the real source is the subjective influence of the psyche.³⁰ This carries on the thoughts of Plato, who said that, “the idea, a kind of a spiritual model, is pre-existent and supraordinate to the appearance or phenomenon.”³¹

By way of analogy, the thresholds of consciousness are compared to sense functions of sight and sound. There are thresholds for human eyes and ears based on physiology. Wavelengths of light from 7700 to 3900 angstroms are visible to the human eye. Sound frequencies from 20 to 20,000 vibrations per second are perceptible to the human ear.³² Wavelengths and frequencies outside these thresholds exist but are imperceptible to human senses. Similar thresholds exist in the psyche. The range established by archetypal attitudes and

²⁷ Ibid., 264.

²⁸ Ibid., 187, 223-234.

²⁹ Aniela Jaffé, *The Myth of Meaning*, trans. R. F. C. Hull (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1971). 15.

³⁰ Jung, “Psychological Types,” 220.

³¹ Jaffé, *The Myth of Meaning*. 16.

³² C.G. Jung, “On the Nature of the Psyche,” in *The Basic Writings of C.G. Jung*, ed. Violet S. de Laszlo (New York: Random House, 1954). 46.

functions governs conscious perception. “The collective unconscious is not accessible to direct observation. But it can be investigated by an indirect and roundabout way, through the observation of conscious and therefore comprehensible contents that permits inferences to be drawn as to its nature and its structure.”³³

Preferences indicate attraction or aversion to people, tasks, and events. For example, individuals either prefer *extraversion* or *introversion* (expressive or reserved). Everyone has a capacity for both and “there can never occur a pure type in the sense that he is entirely possessed of the one mechanism with a complete atrophy of the other.”³⁴ A typical attitude always signifies merely the relative predominance (preference) of one mechanism. The relative weight of predominance of an attitude (or function) is the subject of personality type measurement indicators.

Preference also applies to the functions. Individuals either prefer *sensing* (observant) perception or *intuitive* (introspective) perception. Likewise, one prefers either *thinking* (tough-minded) judgment or *feeling* (friendly) judgment. All four functions can become conscious and manifest in behavior. Individuals have a primary (dominant) function and an auxiliary function. The primary function will indicate a life style orientation in which one prefers to operate publicly--in one of the *perceiving* functions or one of the *judging* functions. The significance of the auxiliary function is that it is “always one whose nature is different from, though not antagonistic to, the leading function.”³⁵ For example, *sensing* (observant) as primary function can readily pair with *thinking* (tough-minded) as auxiliary or equally well with *feeling* (friendly), but never with *intuition* (introspective). *Intuition* is antagonistic to *sensing* because they are both perceiving functions.

³³ Jaffé, *The Myth of Meaning*. 16.

³⁴ Jung, “Psychological Types,” 187.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 239.

The strength and influence of preference is illustrated by the analogy of handedness. A right-handed individual demonstrates a preference for using the right hand. As a result, that hand gets stronger, more nimble, and develops greater dexterity. It does not indicate an inability to use the left hand. The left hand is just less developed--first because it is the non-preference and as a result it is less used and therefore less mature. The preference-influenced behavior is most evident *in times of stress*. A right-handed person uses both hands differently in varied situations, but the more developed hand will be the one on which they rely to break a fall or catch a ball. This does not deny ambidexterity (the ability to use both hands equally); however, because they have no clear preference there is wasted time in unconsciously deciding which hand to use in times of stress.³⁶

It can be difficult to understand all the possibilities of preferences for attitudes, functions, and orientations. The combinations of preferences for attitude (*extraversion* or *introversion*), function (*sensing* or *intuition* and *thinking* or *feeling*), and orientation (*perceiving* or *judging*) each have implications for public attitude, cognition, and behavior. Knowing just a subset of the combinations (for example *introverted thinking* or *sensing judging*) can provide some accurate information for making predictions about behavior. This is the premise from which David Keirsey explored the Four Temperaments.³⁷

Before addressing the Keirsey Temperaments it will be helpful to explore the work done to popularize and mainstream Jung's cumbersome theory of psychological types. Jung wrote for "a largely specialized audience of psychologists . . . and even the English translation of his work makes heavy reading."³⁸ In 1942, prompted by World War II--and the conviction that the war

³⁶ Otto Kroeger and Janet M. Thuesen, *Type Talk: The 16 Personality Types That Determine How We Live, Love, and Work* (New York: Dell Publishing, 1988). 14-15.

³⁷ David Keirsey and Marilyn Bates, *Please Understand Me: Character & Temperament Types* (Del Mar, CA: Prometheus Nemesis Book Company, 1984). 4.

³⁸ Isabel Briggs Myers and Peter B. Myers, *Gifts Differing : Understanding Personality Type* (Palo Alto, Calif.: Davies-Black Pub., 1995). xii.

was caused, in part, by people not understanding differences--Katherine Cook Briggs and her daughter, Isabel Briggs Myers, who had no formal psychological training, began to develop a series of questions to measure personality differences. The result was the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI).³⁹ The two women made extensions of Jung's theory with practical, daily applications (beyond the fields of psychology and anthropology) with particular consideration of the auxiliary processes in relation to the primary, dominant preference. The type table (figure 1) enables one to visualize the relationships of the sixteen resulting types.

		SENSING TYPES		INTUITIVE TYPES-(N)	
		With Thinking	With Feeling	With Feeling	With Thinking
INTROVERTS-(I)	Judging	ISTJ	ISFJ	INFJ	INTJ
	Perceptive	ISTP	ISFP	INFP	INTP
EXTRAVERTS	Perceptive	ESTP	ESFP	ENFP	ENTP
	Judging	ESTJ	ESFJ	ENFJ	ENTJ

Figure 1. Type Table⁴⁰

³⁹ Kroeger and Thuesen, *Type Talk*. 281-283.

⁴⁰ Myers and Myers, *Gifts Differing : Understanding Personality Type*. 212-213.

Sixteen types would be an unwieldy number to keep in mind if the types were arbitrary or unrelated categories. But they are closely related, particularly to other types that share some preferences.⁴¹ David Keirsey “found it convenient and useful to partition Myers’ sixteen types into four groups.”⁴² These groupings are based on how many ways these groups are alike. The groups are (1) the SPs, (2) the SJs, (3) the NFs, and (4) the NTs (see appendix). As was stated before, any groupings provide insights to behavior, but the temperaments in particular contrast so sharply as to provide predictable attitudes and actions.

Theory of Planning

Military planning is a component of problem solving and decision making. Joint and Army publications describe the joint operations planning process and the MDMP in detail, but this section will focus on the theory of planning with particular attention given to problem solving and creative thinking. The planning process exists to support the commander in making decisions. The relationship of the commander to the staff is a function of personality, but theory is not situational (as doctrinal procedures may be) and seeks these same goals: (1) utilitarian--to improve performance or operations, (2) pedagogic--to instruct, and (3) cognitive--to facilitate and frame thought.⁴³

Planning is “the means by which the commander envisions a desired outcome, lays out effective ways of achieving it, and communicates to his subordinates his battlefield visualization, intent, and decisions, focusing on the results he expects to achieve.”⁴⁴ As a part of the operations process (planning, preparation, execution and assessment driven by battle command) planning

⁴¹ Ibid. 21.

⁴² David Keirsey, *Please Understand Me II: Temperament, Character, Intelligence* (Del Mar, Ca: Prometheus Nemesis Book Company, 1998). 18.

⁴³ Clausewitz, *On War*. 14.

⁴⁴ Headquarters, *FM 3-0*. 6-1.

allows the commander and staff to translate the commander's visualization into a specific course of action for preparation and execution. "The commander's visualization is the process of developing a clear understanding of the current state with relation to the enemy and environment, envisioning a desired end state which represents mission accomplishment, and then subsequently visualizing the sequence of activity that moves the force from its current state to the end state."⁴⁵

Because the operations process is cyclical and overlapping, planning is continuous and not confined to a single step in the process. During preparation (those activities to improve the ability to conduct operations including *plan refinement*, rehearsals, reconnaissance, coordination, inspections, and movement) planners continue their work with and for the commander. Even in execution (putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission and using situational understanding to assess progress and make execution and adjustment decisions) planning continues to support decisions. Execution decisions are selecting what needs to be done next according to the plan (if the progress of the operation is meeting expectations), and adjustment decisions are selecting what must be done to exploit opportunity or restore mission accomplishment.⁴⁶

Planning consists in formalized procedures specifically regarding an integrated system of decisions through decomposition, articulation, and rationalization.⁴⁷ The formalized procedures include the actions taken (step-by-step or continuously) and the output--the plan. The integrated system of decisions identifies *if* a decision needs to be made, by whom, then when and what to decide. The decomposition is identifying the problem (or problem set) and breaking it down into component parts for analysis. This can be done systematically or intuitively based upon relative complexity, experience, and time available. The articulation is the development of a concept--a

⁴⁵ Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate Headquarters, *Student Text (ST) 6-0. Command and Control* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Command and General Staff College, 2000). Glossary-2.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.* 2-11.

⁴⁷ Mintzberg, *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning*. 14.

representation or a model--of the problem. This is critical since planning can only attempt to solve a problem as it is conceived. If the conception and articulation are wrong then planners may not solve the problem as it exists. Finally, rationalization ensures objective, factual, logical, and realistic solutions with internal consistency.⁴⁸

Problem Solving and Decision Making

Russell Ackoff defines a problem as having five types of components. (1) The decision maker(s) who must face the problem; (2) the controllable variables--under the control of the decision maker; (3) the uncontrolled variables--outside the control of the decision maker, but which can affect the outcome of the decision; (4) constraints imposed from within or without on the possible values of the controllable and uncontrolled variables; and (5) the possible outcomes produced jointly by the decision and the uncontrolled variables.⁴⁹

Gary Klein addresses several traditional models of problem solving.⁵⁰ Stage models represent the traditional models of linear problem solving. These structured and sequential models vary in the number of stages, but they all: (1) define the problem, (2) generate a course of action, (3) evaluate the course of action, and (4) carry out the course of action.⁵¹ These models focus on the output at the expense of valuable input. Specifically, in order to define the problem it is necessary to have well-defined goals. Well-defined goals usually only exist in laboratory settings whereas natural goals seem to be ill defined.

The artificial intelligence approach tries to use computers to perform complex judgment and reasoning tasks. The difficulty being that this is not how people make decisions. Computers

⁴⁸ Russell L. Ackoff, *The Art of Problem Solving* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1978). 13 and Mintzberg, *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning*. 13.

⁴⁹ Ackoff, *The Art of Problem Solving*. 11-12.

⁵⁰ Gary Klein, *Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999). 121-146.

⁵¹ Ibid. 121-126

set up a problem space and perform searches to refine a set of objects, relations, and properties.

“The primary mechanism of artificial intelligence is just to spread out the alternatives exhaustively and filter through them efficiently. This is the same strategy used in analytical approaches to decision making.”⁵² The perceptual approach to problem solving (Gestalt psychology) uses perceptions in thought rather than treating thought as calculating ways to manipulate symbols. This approach uses skills such as pattern recognition.

Pattern recognition describes how people think. The Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) model is not a stage model but a descriptive model of the natural decision making process as it occurs. The problem with Gary Klein’s research methodology is that the “thinking out loud research process does not represent active imagination which reveals the deeper layers of the unconscious, but only wishful thinking which is a product of the unconscious arranged by the ego.”⁵³ Experience is the means through which one establishes patterns (pictures, sequences, leverage points, systems, stories, et cetera). Vicarious experience still counts and metaphors, analogies, and mental simulation solidify the patterns in the mind.⁵⁴

Metaphor and analogy depict patterns. Pattern recognition and mental simulation can use metaphor and analogy to continue “the story” to its likely conclusion. Military analogy can be found throughout the body of military history. Linkages may be dubious (or even faulty) but the “well read” problem solver can construct patterns (or build on existing patterns) from vast experience (including vicarious experience). One need not be aware that they are using the RPD method and subconscious to conscious (or logical) problem solving need not be linear by following a series of steps.

⁵² Ibid. 133.

⁵³ Jaffé, *The Myth of Meaning*. 98,

⁵⁴ Klein, *Sources of Power*. 17 and 30.

Theory provides a proposed explanation of a particular phenomenon. Jung's writing on psychological type was refined by Isabel Briggs Myers to classify people into sixteen personality types. These types are based on attitudes, functions, and orientations for public behavior. These types manifest in differences in cognition and behavior. David Keirsey simplified personality classification through use of the four temperaments. Planning is the body of procedures for problem solving and decision making in which a problem is decomposed, rationally analyzed, and a solution is articulated. Military planning uses standard procedures (doctrine) to provide recommended decisions. The Army process is the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). Leaders at all levels in the Army must understand the processes and apply the doctrine. Leadership is a function of command and control and battle command drives the operations process of planning, preparing, executing and assessing. In order to investigate the relationship of personality to the planning process, it is necessary to articulate a coherent methodology for investigation and illustration.

METHODOLOGY

Extraordinary leaders distinguish themselves in tough situations by their character, competence, and determination to achieve excellence. Their experience and professional judgment allow them to make sound decisions under great stress, and the force of their character imbues their subordinates with confidence. They possess an unyielding desire to attain victory and the insight and ability to achieve it. They are also individuals with unique personalities. The Army's leadership framework holistically portrays four dimensions of what leaders must BE, KNOW, and DO.

At the foundation of Army leadership are the Army values: Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity and Personal Courage (LDRSHIP). A leader must also BE in possession of certain mental, physical, and emotional attributes. The mental attributes of an Army

leader include will, self-discipline, initiative, judgment, self-confidence, intelligence, and cultural awareness. The physical attributes are health, physical fitness, and professional bearing and the emotional attributes are self-control, balance, and stability.⁵⁵ These values and attributes form one's character, and this research builds on character by recognizing the existence and influence of personality type on attitude, cognition, and behavior.

The skills that a leader must KNOW consist in four categories. (1) Interpersonal skills are critical in a soldier-oriented organization like the Army and nowhere is the potential power of personality type so relevant. "Leadership is *influencing people*--by providing purpose, direction, and motivation--while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization."⁵⁶ Influencing people requires interpersonal skills that include coaching, teaching, counseling, motivating, and empowering. (2) Conceptual skills, Jung would argue, exist both in one's consciousness and in the archetypes which form personality type in the collective unconscious. "Conceptual skills enable one to handle ideas. They require sound judgment as well as the ability to think creatively and reason analytically, critically, and ethically."⁵⁷ (3) Technical skills are job-related abilities and basic soldier skills necessary to complete assigned tasks and functions and (4) tactical skills complete the dimension of skills a leader must KNOW.⁵⁸

Actions that a leader must DO are the final dimension of the Army leadership framework. The actions consist of influencing, operating, and improving actions. Influencing actions include communicating, decision making, and motivating. These relate to the interpersonal and conceptual skills of the leader, which were already associated with personality. The operating actions are consistent with the operations process already described--planning, preparation,

⁵⁵ Department of the Army Headquarters, *Field Manual (FM) 22-100. Army Leadership* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1999). 1-3, 2-11 to 2-17.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* 1-4.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.* 2-25.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.* 1-7

executing, and assessing. Finally, improving actions are developing (mentoring), building (teamwork), and learning (seeking self-improvement and organizational growth).⁵⁹ The Army leadership framework defines what Army leaders must BE, KNOW, and DO. The values, attributes, skills, and actions depict standards and goals for which all leaders strive. The extent to which leaders master the domains of the leadership framework accounts for some of the consistency among professionals. Fundamental personality types account for some of the differences.

Personality and the Planning Process

So far it has been established that human behavior is not random but predictable and therefore classifiable. Operations planning and the MDMP are analytical processes used in the military approach to problem solving and decision making. Research provides insight into the relationship between personality and planning. There are causal linkages, to be sure, between individual personality type and techniques of problem solving and decision making. Without the use of a measurement indicator to determine personality type, this researcher's attempt to label or "type" a historical figure for illustration would lack credibility. Likewise the data is not available for the collection of staff officers and subordinates who would have advised the commander in his decisions.

Historical vignettes from actual operations will establish a medium for illustration and analysis. These are not intended to be exhaustive case studies, only a backdrop upon which to lay personality and the planning process. Also of note, the modern doctrinal procedures for formal planning (the Army's MDMP and the modern Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) planning processes) were not in use at the time of the illustrative vignettes. Analysis will focus on proposed explanations (or theory). The benefit of such analysis is that application

⁵⁹ Ibid. 1-8.

and doctrine are situational. To demonstrate relevance to today, one need only apply the proposed explanations to the contemporary environment.

The historical vignettes used for illustration will be (1) the United Nations counteroffensive in Korea 1951, and (2) the Anglo-American drive to the Rhine at Arnhem in 1944. Each vignette will identify the decision maker, the controllable variables, the uncontrolled variables which can affect the outcome of the decision, the constraints and values of the variables, and the possible outcomes produced jointly by the decision and the uncontrolled variables. This will serve to frame the historical, operational problems. The model for analysis will be to utilize the MDMP from the perspective of four different planners, each with a unique personality type represented by the four Keirsey temperaments.

The United Nations counteroffensive on the Korean peninsula (1951)

General Matthew B. Ridgway was perhaps one of the most extraordinary American commanders of the twentieth century. He was the World War II commander of the 82nd Airborne Division and XVIII Airborne Corps, the Korean War commander who restored the fighting shape of Eighth Army after its long retreat from the Yalu River and he later replaced General of the Army Douglas MacArthur as United Nations Commander in Chief in Far East Command. He went on to serve as Supreme Allied Commander Europe and finally as Chief of Staff of the Army.⁶⁰

Eighth Army had been through much in the six months since Task Force Smith arrived near Osan, Korea on July 5, 1950. The United Nations (UN) forces had conducted a delay, an unorganized withdrawal, and desperate defense along the Pusan perimeter. They resumed the offensive in September with the amphibious assault at Inchon and the breakout from Pusan. After

⁶⁰ Mathew B. Ridgway and Harold H. Martin, *Soldier OP* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1974). 1-4.

recapturing Seoul, UN forces continued into North Korea to eliminate the *Inmun Gun* (the North Korean People's Army). Intelligence estimates indicated that neither China nor Russia would intervene, and if they did, only 60,000 Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) would be able to get across the Yalu River and interfere. Unknown, was that in June the CCF had begun movement of the CCF Fourth Field Army under Lin Piao (some 600,000 troops) into Manchuria, along the North Korean border, and by September nearly 300,000 Chinese were already in North Korea.⁶¹

Whatever its skill or courage, it cannot be argued that the U.S. Army suffered from deficiencies in discipline and training. It was not until several months into the Korean War that new trainees underwent half their training in the field and a third of it by night. From October 26 to December 15, a series of CCF counteroffensives had compelled the UN forces into retreat from the Yalu River all the way back to the 38th Parallel. The U.N force of 140,000 Americans, 20,000 British, Turks, other Allies and 100,000 South Korean soldiers were on the edge of disaster.⁶²

General Ridgway demonstrated his character when he assumed command of Eighth Army in Korea on December 26, 1950, following the death of General Walton Walker in a jeep accident. (The decision to replace Walker had occurred before his death, but there was an understandable reluctance to publicly trample on the dead man's grave). A defeatist attitude had infected many of the troops and leaders of Eighth Army. Arriving in these depressing circumstances, Ridgway directed his staff to prepare for counterattack. "There will be no more discussion of retreat. We're going back!"⁶³ He went forward to get the feel of his command, to measure his commanders and the circumstances by looking leaders and soldiers in the eye and measuring their spirit. Ridgway said he was "not there to trespass on the sphere of his

⁶¹ T.R. Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War: The Classic Korean War History* (Washington DC: Brassey's, 1963). 185-193.

⁶² Ibid. 251.

⁶³ Ibid. 259.

subordinates but to drink in, by his senses and all his experience, the actual situation, the human element above all else.” Ridgway believed strongly that “a basic element in troop leadership is the responsibility of the commander to be where the crisis of action *is going to happen*.”⁶⁴

Part of this personal assessment process involved gauging the capability of subordinate commanders to deal with the situation at hand. In Korea, Ridgway visited every corps and division commander assigned to his army within forty-eight hours of his arrival. He made the commanders brief him on their own ground. He moved his headquarters forward so that he could visit his subordinates daily. He sought first of all to restore the army’s fighting spirit, to demand adherence to high standards of tactical discipline at all levels of command, and to build tactical cohesion by demanding cooperation among units.

Ridgway turned the Eighth Army around (after giving up Seoul soon after his arrival) and attacked north to a defensive line that met military requirements and political objectives (essentially along the 38th parallel). Among his most important contributions, General Ridgway ensured high standards of tactical discipline. Walking the ground with his commanders, he discovered that they were often ignorant of the ground in front of them and the enemy in their area. He ordered the infantry off the roads and onto the high ground, demanded continuous patrolling, and initiated offensive reconnaissance to restore contact with the enemy.

The decision maker in this vignette is General Matthew B. Ridgway.

The controllable variables include the Eighth Army forces which were under his command. He could influence the morale of his troops and was credited with restoring a fighting spirit in the Eighth Army. He controlled the discipline and training of his subordinates and demanded they regain contact with the enemy. He controlled the operation by approving plans, and he even relieved his G3, COL Dabney, shortly after taking command when Dabney told

⁶⁴ From unpublished draft of FM 100-5 *Operations*, 1998.

Ridgway, “Here, General, are our contingency plans for retreat.”⁶⁵ As commander, Ridgway also controlled priorities for supplies, air support, and reserves.

The uncontrolled variables, which could affect the outcome of the decision, included (most importantly) the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF). The size, locations, tactics, and intent of the enemy forces are paramount to any military commander (particularly because they are only controllable by the enemy commander). The political situation was not within the commander’s control. The United Nations Security Council resolution, the United States policy, and potential involvement by the Soviets would not allow Ridgway total freedom of action. The involvement of Allies—including Republic of Korea (ROK) forces--were to some extent uncontrollable by Ridgway. Finally, harsh weather and very difficult terrain were uncontrollable.

The constraints and values of the variables can have significant impact on any operation. Attacks into Manchuria or against any China mainland targets were forbidden. No Chinese Nationalist forces, under Chiang Kai-shek, were allowed to join the effort against the CCF. The relative value of these variables was significant and the Allies had to face the CCF alone on the peninsula. The availability of Allied airpower and artillery proved an advantage over the mainly foot-borne infantry of the CCF, but the CCF tactics of hiding by day and attacking by night helped to negate the value of these means. Logistics are important to both sides in a conflict and their value can be decisive. Cutting an Army’s lines of communication (those connecting the base to the force) can force a capitulation.

The possible outcomes produced jointly by the decision and the uncontrolled variables could span the entire range from total victory to unintentional defeat. If the CCF was able to continue South in spite the Allied effort (which was the case initially as the CCF pushed past Seoul) the potential defeat on the Korean peninsula would have significant consequences for the entire policy of containment. The aggressive use of Allied airpower and artillery could permit

⁶⁵ Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War: The Classic Korean War History*. 259.

victory through technology without having to rely on the disappointing fighting spirit of the troops of 1950. This reliance on technology alone proved unsuccessful because of the manner in which the CCF learned to adapt to long-range indirect fire. Due in part to the political situation, a stalemate along the entire front could be the best hoped for result.

The Drive to the Rhine at Arnhem of Operation Market-Garden (1944)

After the breakout, exploitation and pursuit to the West wall of the summer of 1944, Supreme Commander, General Dwight Eisenhower had been searching for both a target and a suitable opportunity to seize a bridgehead across the Rhine River. Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery (commanding 21st Army Group), had been given tactical use of the First Allied Airborne Army, under its American commander, Lieutenant General Lewis Brereton.

Eisenhower had to approve all airborne plans but Field Marshal Montgomery was given permission to explore a possible airborne operation across the Rhine. Eisenhower encouraged bold and imaginative airborne plans for the First Allied Airborne Army, and several plans were approved but had to be cancelled due to the rapidly advancing land forces which had already reached the would-be airborne objectives.⁶⁶

One plan that showed promise was Operation Comet, which called for Brereton's airborne force to seize a Rhine River crossing west of the town of Wesel. Heavy antiaircraft defenses around Wesel caused Montgomery to look further west on the Holland-German border--to the bridge at Arnhem. The last minute cancellations of other airborne operations had significant impact on the ground forces of General Bradley's 12th Army Group and particularly General Patton's Third Army. As aircraft were prepared for airborne operations, they were unavailable to deliver supplies and haul gasoline to the front along the Saar (north of Alsace-

⁶⁶ Cornelius Ryan, *A Bridge Too Far* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1974). 63-66.

Lorraine). Likewise, Eisenhower was concerned about the opening of the port at Antwerp, and any airborne attack to the Rhine would delay that opening.⁶⁷

Any potential airborne operation would have to be conducted in conjunction with an Army-size ground operation to link-up and secure the bridgehead. General Miles Dempsey, commander of the British Second Army, expressed his doubts about his Army's strength to drive north to Arnhem alone and advocated instead an advance toward Wesel in conjunction with General Hodges' First U.S. Army. However, Montgomery boldly pushed his grandiose plan to seize a succession of river crossings in Holland with the major objective being the Lower Rhine bridge at Arnhem. The plan called for three and a half divisions (the U.S. 82nd and 101st, the British 1st Airborne, and the Polish 1st Parachute Brigade). The British Second Army would then attack over the Rhine and eventually continue east into the Ruhr. Eisenhower approved.

The decision maker in this case is General Eisenhower. Field Marshal Montgomery's influence is undisputed and he deserves the credit for planning an operation that General Omar Bradley called "one of the most imaginative of the war."⁶⁸

The controllable variables include the choice of objectives and the direction and distance of attack. The airborne forces had to secure a series of crossings--including five major bridges. The forces would be stretched approximately sixty-four miles between the border of Holland and Arnhem. General Frederick Browning, commander of the British First Airborne, was troubled that the ground forces would take a few days (seventy-five miles of fighting) to reach the airborne forces. Browning told Montgomery that he could hold for four days, "but sir, I think we might be going a bridge too far."⁶⁹

⁶⁷ Ibid. 68-74.

⁶⁸ Ibid. 66.

⁶⁹ Ibid. 89.

The other controllable variables include the make-up of the Allied force. The airborne drop (code name Market) included the three divisions and a brigade, and the ground portion of the operation (code name Garden) included Dempsey's Second Army. Knowing that any delay might jeopardize Market-Garden, Eisenhower assured Montgomery that Patton's drive to the Saar would be curbed and the aircraft, fuel, and other resources would be made available at the rate of a thousand tons per day. September 17, 1944 was set as the day to initiate Market-Garden.

The uncontrolled variables, which could affect the outcome of the decision, must again include the enemy. The enemy air defenses at Wesel, the first V-2 rockets (believed to be somewhere in western Holland) had begun to impact in London, and intelligence reports indicated only a few infantry reserves and low category troops in the Netherlands. A Dutch intelligence report indicated that some panzer formations had been sent to Holland to refit, but this report was widely ignored, partially due to the optimism in Montgomery's 21st Army Group headquarters. The report was true and by September 15, two panzer divisions from General Bittrich's II SS Panzer Corps had settled in Arnhem for refitting and rehabilitation.⁷⁰

The constraints and value of the variables include the broad front strategy, which allocated resources across the front for operations toward the Saar and the Ruhr. The intelligence report about the SS divisions reorganizing at Arnhem was the most valuable variable. The fact that it was ignored or misunderstood had dire consequences and threatened both the airborne and ground missions. This ultimately caused the mission to fail.

The possible outcomes produced jointly by the decision and the uncontrolled variables include resourcing Montgomery in order to establish a bridgehead across the Rhine, which meant the halt of Patton's Third army. An operational failure of the Airborne forces (if shot down near Wesel) could have jeopardized the future of Airborne operations. This led Montgomery to reject

⁷⁰ Ibid. 84-89.

Operation Comet and conceive Operation Market-Garden against Arnhem on a huge scale by comparison. Even the success of one aspect of the mission (Market--the air part) would not effect the ground component of Second Army (Garden). The linkup was the critical part of the operation.

These vignettes will serve as the medium for analysis. The analysis will involve hypothetical planners with different personality types conducting the MDMP for the problems represented in the historical vignettes. The planners with different personality types will depict the perspective of the four Keirsey temperaments (see appendix).

A relationship of personality to the planning process has been suggested. With the preceding methodology for investigation and illustration, intentional analysis can begin to answer the research question: Do planners with differing personality types--different ways of perceiving (sensing and intuition) and judging (thinking and feeling)--conduct the planning process differently?

ANALYSIS

Leaders execute leadership to influence people while conducting the operations process to improve their organization. Even leaders who master the domains of the leadership framework exhibit differences in attitude, cognition, and behavior. These differences result from manifestations of personality types. "Our understanding of leadership is incomplete because of ambiguity, inconsistency, and paradox."⁷¹ This is because much of the study of leaders focuses on traits without understanding (or acknowledging) the underlying processes that generate these traits.

⁷¹ Robert L. Taylor and William E. Rosenbach, eds. *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996). 2.

This analysis is of underlying processes, which are differentiated by preferences that animate personality type. The methodology described two historical vignettes of leaders facing an operational problem. These leaders (decision makers) came as close as any to mastering the domains of the leadership framework and illustrated the traits approximating the “ideal leader”. The appendix gives form to the four Keirsey temperaments, which represent only a subset of Myers’ sixteen personality types based on Jung’s theory.

Although the current doctrine describes the MDMP as a sequential process, emerging doctrine seeks to capitalize on information technology to facilitate parallel planning between headquarters, and it seeks to make planning more collaborative by working in shared electronic workspace--to be shared on the tactical internet. This will make the seven steps (in which the completion of one step leads to the beginning of the next step) into seven *actions* to be conducted more simultaneously. These multiple simultaneous actions will be permeable as greater clarity leads to refinement of other ongoing actions. The goal of this anticipatory decision making is to complete the process faster and with broader understanding among all participants (including anyone with access to the shared workspace).⁷²

The analysis will compare, contrast, and distinguish the four temperaments of personality type by using the Army’s military planning process (MDMP) in the historical problems cited in the methodology above. The operational problem identified in each of the vignettes will be addressed from the perspective of a planner with preferences for the functions represented by the temperaments. The analysis is not scientific but will serve to compare and contrast the personality influence when using the same planning process--MDMP. It will also serve to distinguish differences in perception and judgment processes which spring from the archetypes of

⁷² From draft Chapter 5 to *FM 101-5*, 2000.

personality. “Archetypes are active living dispositions, ideas in the Platonic sense, that perform and continually influence our thought and feelings and actions.”⁷³

Since military planning is a cognitive (conceptual) process conducted as a group in battle staffs made up of people with individual personality types, the analysis does not neglect interpersonal skills. Personality type effects both the conceptual and interpersonal behaviors of military planners. The temperaments describe differences in perception and judgment and these are not limited to ideas and facts. They also include perceptions of, and judgements about, other people in a group and people in general. To describe the medium for illustrative analysis a brief understanding of the MDMP is warranted.




Figure 2. The Military Decision Making Process (MDMP)⁷⁴

⁷³ C.G. Jung, “Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious,” in *The Basic Writings of C.G. Jung*, ed. Violet de Laszlo (New York: Random House, 1959). 288.

⁷⁴ Headquarters, *FM 101-5*. 5-2.

The MDMP has seven steps: (Figure 2). (1) Receipt of Missions, (2) Mission Analysis (3) Course of Action Development, (4) Course of Action Analysis (War Game), (5) Course of Action Comparison, (6) Course of Action Approval, and (7) Orders Preparation.

The United Nations counteroffensive on the Korean peninsula (1951)

From the “SJ” Temperament Perspective

In the first step of the MDMP (receipt of mission) the new mission is either issued by a higher headquarters or derived from ongoing operations. The SJ planner asks the question “WHAT?” and prefers to be told what to do in concrete terms. Upon assuming command, General Ridgway asked General MacArthur, “if I get over there and find the situation warrants it, do I have your permission to attack?”⁷⁵ In Korea 1951, the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) consisted of a “large goose egg on the map in which the figure 174,000 was inscribed.”⁷⁶ This is completely unacceptable to the SJ for they thrive on detailed procedures that yield detailed results--not approximations in the aggregate. The tasks (specified, implied and essential) derive from the situation and the SJ would employ systematic analysis to determine where there are gaps in capability (such as in the elements of combat power: maneuver, firepower, protection, leadership and information).⁷⁷ They would immediately schedule activities to bring order (reconnaissance, increased discipline, and commander visits to the front).

The constraints, facts, and assumptions carry much weight for SJs because they establish realities and bound behavior. The prohibitions against attack outside the peninsula, and political satisfaction with reestablishing a front along the thirty-eighth parallel helped to define what the force “should do.” Risk assessment and determining Commander’s Critical Information

⁷⁵ Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War: The Classic Korean War History*. 300.

⁷⁶ Ibid. 300.

⁷⁷ Headquarters, *FM 3-0*. 4-3.

Requirements (CCIR) further define the operational environment so the SJ can schedule order. Initial reconnaissance and planning use of available time are mainstays of the SJ planner. They can determine what concrete information requirements drive the operation and they naturally plan and schedule everything in their daily lives.

Course of action (COA) development (a deliberate attempt to design unpredictable COAs--difficult for the enemy to deduce) can prove more difficult for the SJ planner. They are comfortable analyzing relative combat power where science provides concrete formulas for tangible data (troop strength and equipment). Quantifying the intangibles (leadership, morale, teamwork) requires procedures to yield satisfactory results. Generating options for COA development requires SJs to use their undeveloped process of *intuition*. They can easily generate options based on their physiological senses, but these are often predictable (and easily deduced by the enemy). The same applies to developing a scheme of maneuver. SJs work well in established procedures for assigning task and purpose to elements in a physical battlefield organization (deep, close, rear, reserves, and security; designating a main effort and priorities for support).⁷⁸ Current operations doctrine redefines the battlefield organization as “actions in time and space to accomplish a mission”--decisive operations, shaping operations, and sustaining operations.⁷⁹ These conceptual operations do not lend themselves to physical analysis in which the SJs excel.

The extent to which COA analysis (wargaming) and COA comparison conform to a process to give tangible results, determines the level of SJ “buy-in.” They are well suited to closely supervising the process and inspecting all products thoroughly. They will ensure all legitimate needs of the process (orderly conduct, necessary participation, note-taking, and preparation of products on schedule) are met promptly. They will also be superior in mechanical

⁷⁸ Department of the Army Headquarters, *Field Manual (FM) 100-5. Operations* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993). 6-13.

⁷⁹ Headquarters, *FM 3-0*. 4-22.

procedures for calculating effects, capturing data, and preparing media for presentation (COA approval) and dissemination (orders production).

From the “NF” Temperament Perspective

Mission analysis for the NFs will focus beyond the words of the higher headquarters or that which is readily apparent in the situation. They perceive the data that is obvious and look beyond that data for underlying meaning in the pursuit of harmony. NFs would understand the new restrictions on Eighth Army--“*Fight the war, but don’t get anyone killed*. Such orders were never issued--but they were clearly understood.”⁸⁰ The NF planner asks the question, “WHO?” which other temperaments assert has little bearing on planning military operations. However, full spectrum operations include four types of military action--offense, defense, stability and support--in joint, multinational, and interagency operations.⁸¹ The nature of the mission dictates the proportion and relationship of the types of military action and people are involved across the spectrum. In the vignette, the NF planner would concern himself with the battlefield effects on the soldiers and leaders of the Eighth Army. Likewise, evaluation of the threat would be extended to Lin Piao and the other CCF commanders. Determining their intent and potential for continued operations would consume the NF. In terms of tasks, the NFs trust their intuitive feelings unquestionably and they are valuable in deriving implied tasks necessary to preserve the force (deception operations and force protection). In the review of available assets, the intangibles would be far more important than the numbers and category analysis. Their capacity for empathy would be valuable in reviewing morale and “health” of the command and subordinates.

⁸⁰ Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War: The Classic Korean War History*. 366.

⁸¹ Headquarters, *FM 3-0*. 1-15.

Determining constraints, facts and assumptions would again reveal the NF propensity for relationships. Internally to the staff, the NF planner would work to personally facilitate a harmonious working environment to give meaning and wholeness to people's lives. The NF preference for the future and the pathway makes them a creative, intuitive asset for COA development. Relative combat power analysis would not discount leadership as the major element and people would be their forte. Their intuitive nature allows them to be creative and their ability to generate unpredictable options (they aspire to be profound) benefits the MDMP. They could also provide valuable input in wargaming and COA comparison by empathetically identifying with the soldiers and leaders involved in the operation.

The Drive to the Rhine at Arnhem of Operation Market-Garden (1944)

From the "SP" Temperament Perspective

The whole idea of planning is anathema to SPs. Having the freedom to act spontaneously, whenever and wherever the opportunity arises, is very important to SPs. But they also like to be where the action is, and any time in the operations process, there are actions in planning. Receipt of a mission to conduct an airborne drop behind enemy lines is only the beginning of possibilities for the SP. The question they ask is "WHEN?" and the answer they seek is "now." The Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) is a bottomless pit of sensing perceptions and information, which fascinates the SP planner. They are not predisposed to concern themselves with decisions about battlefield effects and the threat evaluation, but the data itself is enthralling. SPs only secondarily judge the value of information, so the air defenses and ground forces around Wesel had the same utilitarian value as the reports of refitting divisions in Holland. SPs find the combinations of tasks, constraints, facts, and assumptions restricting their freedom. In conducting risk assessment, they respect themselves for being daring and feel confident in their ability to be adaptable. SPs project these valuations onto others and do not

readily comprehend caution (extreme force protection) and scripted operations with anything more than an ultimate objective. They tend to be optimistic about the future since they will adapt to the circumstances when they arrive at that point in time.

For COA development, SPs are masters at generating alternatives. They do not have the powerful intuition of other types, but they see the world as it is and are open to all the possibilities it presents. In fact, it is necessary to push closure with SPs or they may continue in “brainstorming heaven” and expend valuable time. The SP planner for the Arnhem operation would have recommended every city with a bridge over the Rhine, until a decision was finally made (likely by someone other than the SP).

Wargaming and COA comparison can be crucial in order to optimize (or satisfice) the recommended COA. The decision to proceed to these steps will not satisfy the SP that the alternatives have been exhausted--and they may continue to recommend changes to task organization (number of airborne units in Market, and size of the Garden force), scheme of maneuver (selecting other bridges and objectives), and, most important to the SP, moving D-Day from September 17 (in order to initiate the action and then take it as it comes). For the final step, orders production, SPs do not enjoy exacting structure and schedules (which the SJ's live for). SPs will find completing the process boring and prefer to move on to more excitement and action.

From the “NT” Temperament Perspective

The NT planner is the conceptualizer for whom mission receipt begins an exciting learning adventure. In seeking a bridgehead across the Rhine, and having a strong desire to use the airborne forces (to learn what they were capable of), General Eisenhower opened the floodgates of learning for the NT planner. The question the NTs ask is “WHY?”--trusting in reason to derive an answer. The NTs are never satisfied with face value and seek to understand the underlying architecture and systems that make ideas into reality. They would agree with

Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, "there can be no empirical knowledge that is not already caught and limited by the *a priori* structure of cognition."⁸² The facts (battlefield effects and threat evaluation) are important, but beyond the facts lie the answers.

In reviewing available assets, NTs are tough-minded in figuring out what sort of technology (airborne forces, joint operations) might be useful to solve a given problem. The obvious solution (attack west toward Wesel on the way to the Ruhr) is boring since it lacks learning value. But an innovative, back door approach through Holland (at Arnhem) provides ample opportunity to learn (since no such large-scale operation had yet been attempted). The tasks, constraints, facts, and assumptions of mission analysis appear to NTs as the edges of the envelope (on which one must push to learn what happens).

Determining CCIR, which include Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR), Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI), and Friendly Force Information Requirements (FFIR)⁸³ without discipline can result in an exhaustive list of information requirements as NTs seek to learn why everything happens. The commander's intent for an NT will likely be abstract, impersonal, and utilitarian, based on the assumption that their conceptualization is universal.

COA development, analysis, and comparison can be ends in themselves for the NT, since learning is possible simply by executing the steps. Ideas take form and minor changes can result in entirely new learning. The NT planners differ in generating options (based on which is their dominant function) but whether they are directive (*judging* NTJ) or open-ended (*perceptive* NTP) learning drives all NTs. The assignment of task and purpose to subordinate units ensures internal consistency in any plan. As NTs address why, they ensure that mass, space, and time all focus on a single aim (or purpose). Orders preparation for NTs could result in two extremes without discipline in the process. They will either fill page after page with philosophical, conceptual

⁸² Jaffé, *The Myth of Meaning*. 28.

⁸³ Headquarters, *FM 101-5*. 5-8.

abstractions (which motivate them) or assume the same competence for mental ideas in all people and omit them as too obvious. As in most things, moderation is appropriate.

CONCLUSIONS

“The Army is a learning organization: we have learned to succeed across the full range of conflict and instability that may require military organizations and capabilities.”⁸⁴ As a learning organization, Peter Senge writes that there are five learning disciplines: (1) personal mastery, (2) mental models, (3) building shared vision, (4) team learning, and (5) systems thinking.⁸⁵ The fifth discipline, systems thinking, is the highly conceptual framework which brings together the other four. Interesting to note, that all five disciplines fully describe the NT temperament of personality type (learning, conceptualizers, mental ideas, systems, and independents pushing teamwork).

“The reason the Army organization is ‘unique’ is based on the fact that it does not fit entirely into either the classic technical organization or social (human) organization model.”⁸⁶ Though dominated by people with a preference for publicly using their *judging* (directive) function (represented by the last letter J), the Army is by no means a homogenous organization and all sixteen types can be found in the military--at all levels from privates to sergeants major, and from lieutenants to general officers.

Though Jung’s original theory of psychological types was cumbersome and somewhat incomplete, the subsequent work in the field of personality type has born fruit for practical application. Amateur understanding is all that is required to understand the implications of

⁸⁴ Department of the Army Headquarters, *Field Manual (FM) 100-1. The Army* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1994). i.

⁸⁵ Peter M. Senge, *The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization*, 1 ed. (New York: Currency Doubleday, 1990). 12, 69.

⁸⁶ US Army War College Headquarters, *How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook 1999-2000* (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: US Army War College, 1999). 3-1.

personality type. “Man possesses a consciousness that not only perceives and reacts to what it experiences, but is aware of perceiving and understands what it is experiencing.”⁸⁷ Other theories have received more attention, but reveal themselves as subsets of Myers’ and Keirsey’s work.

Ivan Pavlov saw behavior as nothing more than mechanical responses to environmental stimulation (it worked for dogs). Sigmund Freud claimed that man is driven by instinctual lust, and any higher motives were just disguised versions of that instinct (which may be true for some people). Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (only the self-actualized can forego the worries of sustenance, safety, social, and self-esteem needs) was an NF approach to behavior. These popular theorists could not explain all the temperaments of personality type.⁸⁸

The learning that results from the intellectual movement from appreciation through knowledge to understanding is principally valuable in application.⁸⁹ Understanding the influence of personality type on behavior and how it affects the planning process enables leaders to act. They can use this understanding to capitalize on strengths, develop weaknesses, and mitigate misunderstanding among the unaware. Increased communication (dialog) remains the goal.

“Any complex activity, if it is to be carried on with any degree of virtuosity, calls for appropriate gifts of intellect and temperament. . . . [these] refer to a very highly developed mental aptitude for a particular occupation.”⁹⁰ Appropriate gifts indicates situational importance. Just as the analysis pointed out, a combination of personality types produces the strongest result.

The NT conceptualizes and communicates the vision, the SP generates the alternatives for unconventional strategy, the SJ communicates high expectations, order, and confidence, the NF shows individual concern, and all are willing to show self-sacrifice. The successful leader must be able to call upon their *knowledge* of the staff (and themselves) appropriate to the

⁸⁷ Jaffé, *The Myth of Meaning*. 138.

⁸⁸ Keirsey, *Please Understand Me II*. 20-21.

⁸⁹ Schneider, "Theoretical Paper No. 3: The Theory of Operational Art," 2.

⁹⁰ Clausewitz, *On War*. 100.

requirement. “By knowledge, I do not mean a vast erudition; it is not the question to know a great deal but to know well; to know especially what relates to the mission appointed us.”⁹¹

“Knowledge-based operations will accelerate operating tempos and decision making rate in staffs. Success in the stressful environment will require a special kind of leader, one who is technically capable in the tasks of digital decision making, but who retains the reliance on, and understanding of, how to maximize the unit’s human potential.”⁹² Not only can a commander or chief of staff better use their staff, but they may better understand those whom they cannot control--the enemy. “War is the collision of two living forces.”⁹³ The influences of personality on behavior will effect the enemy forces as well. Appreciating the indicators of personality type, then understanding the influence of the archetypal predisposition of the enemy commander is powerful information.

In order to accomplish on-the-spot decision making represented by the German concept of *Auftragstaktik* (Mission Command) leaders need a common framework and mutual understanding of the visualization and intent. This understanding is easier among leaders who have personality type in common (or at least some of the combinations of preferences for attitude, function, and behavior). Many people are attracted to the military as a profession because it appeals to one of more of their preferences. However, the army is a broad profession and it’s attraction is in the eye of the beholder. All sixteen types can be found in the army, so each of them found something attractive in the people, the organization, the work, the institution, or its possibilities.

Leaders, and particularly commanders and chiefs of staff, can and should incorporate their understanding of individual personality type into the entire operations process--particularly

⁹¹ Antoine Henri Jomini, *The Art of War* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1862). iv.

⁹² Montgomery C. Meigs and Edward J. Fitzgerald III, "University after Next," *Military Review* 78, no. 2 (1998). 43.

⁹³ Clausewitz, *On War*. 77.

planning. By doing so, they can (1) allow variations of perspective to meet individual needs, (2) match individual potential with requirements, (3) resolve conflicts and problems of understanding, (4) reduce stress, (5) achieve time deadlines and milestones, (6) develop capacity in non-preference behaviors (during low stress time), (7) develop compensating behaviors, (8) enable decision making with little information, (9) evaluate decisions as information-intensive or information-sensitive, and (10) strike a balance of effectiveness versus efficiency by seeking appropriate exactness or suitable precision.⁹⁴

The commander is the central figure in military decision making and based on the commander's personality, the information provided and the manner in which it is communicated must suit the commander's needs. The operations process places battle command at the center of all the other processes and as leaders execute planning doctrine, they must view the process as less mechanical and more human interactive. "Doctrine must pay more than lip service to battlefield morale, both in human and organizational terms. . . . The segregation of tactics and leadership in our training publications is symptomatic of how deeply we neglect the human factor in war."⁹⁵

The theories about personality type (psychological types and temperament) propose explanations of the phenomena that make up individual personalities. These theories and associated measurement indicators (Keirsey Temperaments and the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator) provide information to individuals to serve essentially two purposes. First, individuals aware of their own personality type can conduct self-management--that is they can recognize and understand their psychological preferences that influence their attitudes, cognitive functions, and behavior. Second, appreciation and understanding of others' preferences can allow the

⁹⁴ Otto and Janet M. Thuesen Kroeger, *Type Talk at Work* (New York: Delacorte Press, 1992). 11-14 and Isabel Briggs Myers, *Type and Teamwork* (Gainseville, Florida: Center for Applications of Psychological Type, Inc., 1974). 2-4.

⁹⁵ Eden, "Leadership on Future Fields: Remembering the Human Factors in War,". 35.

assignment of tasks in which people can work in their preference (where their abilities are strongest and most developed). In both cases, understanding personality type and associated preferences (concerning attitude, cognitive function, and behavior) can elicit compensating behavior and development of weaker, non-developed preferences.

“At the top levels of the Department of Defense in particular, fascination with technology, finances, and geopolitics continue to relegate human issues--except for a few pet social projects--to the back bench. In fact, any RMA [Revolution in Military Affairs] will sooner or later come to depend more on the sustainment of fighting spirit than on the utilization of cyberspace.”⁹⁶ The degree to which the military is successful in preparing leaders today for the challenges of the future, could make the difference between timely victory and stability, protracted warfare and misery, and potential, unthinkable defeat.

⁹⁶ Walter F. Jr. Ulmer, “Leaders, Managers, and Command Climate,” in *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence*, ed. Robert L. Taylor and William E. Rosenbach (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996). 199.

APPENDIX -- The Keirsey Temperaments

The “SJ” Temperament - The Guardians

This is the “Security Seeking Personality”--trusting in legitimacy and hungering for membership. The question they ask is “WHAT?” The SJs thrive on procedures and their observations are principally so they can schedule their own and others’ activities so that needs are met and conduct is kept within bounds. They are the dependability people--the backbone of any organization. They tend to be indifferent about the present, pessimistic about the future, and skeptical about the past. Having the opportunity to act “within the chain-of-command” is very important to SJs. They are concrete in communicating, cooperative in implementing goals, and can become highly skilled in rule-bound endeavors, such as logistics and commerce. For SJs, everything should be in its proper place, everyone should be doing what they are supposed to, and everybody should be getting what they deserve. Every action should be closely supervised, all products thoroughly inspected, all legitimate needs met promptly, and all approved endeavors carefully underwritten. This group represents forty to forty-five percent of the population. Supervising and inspecting (thinking SJs) or providing and protecting (feeling SJs) are their most developed operations.⁹⁷

The “NF” Temperament - The Idealists

This is the “Identity Seeking Personality”--trusting their intuitive feelings unquestionably and hungering for deep and meaningful relationships. The question they ask is “WHO?” The NF byword is relationship. They are friendly to the core in coming up with ways to give meaning and wholeness to people’s lives. Interpersonal conflict in those around them is painful for NFs, and something they must deal with in a very personal way. Consequently they care very deeply

⁹⁷ Keirsey, *Please Understand Me II*. 93-96 and Kroeger and Thuesen, *Type Talk*. 56.

about keeping morale high in their groups and about nurturing the positive self image of their loved ones. Their preferred time and place is the future and the pathway. They tend to be naive about the future and mystical about the past. They are abstract in communicating, cooperative in implementing goals, and can become highly skilled in diplomatic integration--the idealists. They often speak interpretively and metaphorically of the abstract world of their imagination. This group represents only eight to ten percent of the population. Teaching and counseling (judging NFs) or conferring and tutoring (perceiving NFs) are their most developed operations.⁹⁸

The “SP” Temperament - The Artisans

This is the “Sensation Seeking Personality”--trusting in spontaneity and hungering for impact on others. The question they ask is “WHEN?” Their preferred time and place is here and now. They live for the moment. They tend to be optimistic about the future and cynical about the past. They are masters at generating alternatives and demonstrate they are “street smart” and take the day as it comes. Isabel Myers described SPs probing their immediate surroundings in order to detect and exploit any favorable options that come within their reach. Having the freedom to act spontaneously, whenever and wherever the opportunity arises, is very important to SPs. They are concrete in communicating, utilitarian in implementing goals, and can become highly skilled in tactile crafts (working with their hands)--the artisans. This group represents thirty-five to forty percent of the population. Promoting and operating (thinking SPs) or performing and composing (feeling SPs) are their most developed operations.⁹⁹

⁹⁸ Keirsey, *Please Understand Me II*. 120-125 and Kroeger and Thuesen, *Type Talk*. 53.

⁹⁹ Keirsey, *Please Understand Me II*. 32-35 and Isabel Briggs Myers and Peter B. Meyers, *Gifts Differing: Understanding Personality Type* (Palo Alto, CA: Davies-Black Publishing, 1980). 96-97.

The “NT” Temperament - The Rationals

This is the “Knowledge Seeking Personality”--trusting in reason and hungering for achievement. The question they ask is “WHY?” The NTs are the conceptualizers. They are tough minded in figuring out what sort of technology might be useful to solve a given problem. They demand of themselves to be persistently and consistently rational in their actions. Learning drives these people and they will often “push the system” solely for the learning that might result (regardless of the value of the consequences). Their preferred time and place is the interval and the intersection. They tend to be pragmatic about the present, skeptical about the future, and egocentric about the past. The NTs seek technology and systems related work. They are abstract in communicating, utilitarian in implementing goals, and can become highly skilled in strategic analysis--the rationals. This group represents only five to seven percent of the population. Marshalling and planning (judging NTs) or inventing and configuring (perceiving NTs) are their most developed operations.¹⁰⁰

¹⁰⁰ Keirsey, *Please Understand Me II*. 163-168 and Kroeger and Thuesen, *Type Talk*. 55.

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